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Social Justice and Silicon Valley: A Perspective on the
Apple-FBI Case and the “Going Dark” Debate
MAJ. GEN. CHARLES J. DUNLAP, JR., USAF (RET.)*
INTRODUCTION
Social justice, we are told, “is generally equated with the notion of
equality or equal opportunity in society.”1 It also embraces the idea of
economic justice.2 This essay argues that these concepts are involved in
last year’s dispute between Apple Inc. and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) over an encrypted phone found among the possessions
of one perpetrator of the San Bernardino massacre that killed fourteen
people and wounded twenty-two.3
The phone was believed to be evidence in a terrorism case, and the FBI
received permission from the owner of the phone (the San Bernardino
County Department of Public Health) to search its content. They were
stymied, however, by the Apple phone’s encryption software that
effectively “locked” the phone. The FBI then obtained a court order under
the All Writs Act4 compelling Apple’s assistance in unlocking the phone,
but the corporation resisted doing so.5 The Department of Justice
eventually dropped the case against Apple when the FBI gained access to
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1
Allan Scherlen & Matthew Robinson, Open Access to Criminal Justice Scholarship: A Matter of
Social Justice, 19 J. CRIM. JUST. EDUC. 54, 62 (2008).
2
Defining Economic Justice and Social Justice, CTR. FOR ECON. & SOC. JUST.,
http://www.cesj.org/learn/definitions/defining-economic-justice-and-social-justice/ [https://perma.cc/
UC4G-GVN7] (last visited Jan. 26, 2017).
3
For general background, see Arjun Kharpal, Apple vs FBI: All You Need to Know, CNBC (Mar.
29, 2016, 6:34 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/03/29/apple-vs-fbi-all-you-need-to-know.html
[https://perma.cc/ALL3-MDPH]; Everything We Know About the San Bernardino Terror Attack
Investigation
So
Far,
L.A.
TIMES
(Dec.
14,
2015,
4:03
PM),
http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-san-bernardino-shooting-terror-investigationhtmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/MQ3A-6YWR] (providing information on the San Bernardino terror
attack investigation).
4
28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2012).
5
See Kharpal, supra note 3 (“The judge asked Apple to provide ‘reasonable technical assistance’
to the U.S. authorities, which would require the technology giant to overhaul the system that disables
the phone after 10 unsuccessful password attempts. Once this feature kicks in, all the data on the phone
is inaccessible. Apple declined to help the FBI.”).
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the phone with the help of a third party.
Nevertheless, the dispute highlights what has been called the “going
dark” debate, where technology is frustrating the ability of law
enforcement to investigate crimes and national security threats, even where
the government is working through the judiciary.7 Apple’s contention that
“nothing is more important than the safety of all of our customers”8 is
juxtaposed against the FBI’s broader mission to “protect the American
people”9 in general (and not just Apple customers), as well as the Supreme
Court’s admonition in Haig v. Agee10 that “no governmental interest is
more compelling than the security of the Nation.”11
While Apple argued that the main dispute was one about individual
privacy rights against government intrusion, in truth, it engages
fundamental notions of social justice and the rule of law. This Essay
suggests several key questions. First, in a free society, to what extent
should Silicon Valley—as opposed to the courts—determine what law
enforcement professionals can and cannot do, particularly when the tech
moguls making that determination have the wealth to insulate themselves
from the consequences of their decisions?12
Additionally, if commercial companies believe that encryption is vital
to the viability of their brand, should they nevertheless bear the costs when
their devices enable the commission of criminal acts and terrorism? Should
a statutory presumption be established to benefit victims where a
6
Laurie Segall et al., FBI Says It Has Cracked Terrorist’s iPhone Without Apple’s Help,
CNNMONEY (Mar. 29, 2016, 9:36 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/03/28/news/companies/fbi-appleiphone-case-cracked/ [https://perma.cc/TU4C-4SKD].
7
See KRISTIN FINKLEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44481, ENCRYPTION AND THE “GOING DARK”
DEBATE 1 (2016) (“[S]ome posit that law enforcement is ‘going dark’ as their investigative capabilities
are outpaced by the speed of technological change. As such, law enforcement cannot access certain
information they otherwise may be authorized to obtain.”); Apple vs. the FBI: The Complete Guide,
BLOOMBERG,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/special-reports/apple-fbi-encryption-standoff
[https://perma.cc/JQ3K-7XWV] (last visited Jan. 25, 2017) (providing different perspectives on the
ongoing debate over “encryption, privacy, and the iPhone”).
8
Craig Federighi, Opinion, Apple VP: The FBI Wants to Roll Back Safeguards That Keep Us a
POST
(Mar.
6,
2016),
Step
Ahead
of
Criminals,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/apple-vp-the-fbi-wants-to-roll-back-safeguards-that-keepus-a-step-ahead-of-criminals/2016/03/06/cceb0622-e3d1-11e5-a6f3-21ccdbc5f74e_story.html?
utm_term=.d7607a35734f [https://perma.cc/P7EM-CX5H].
9
Mission & Priorities, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/about/mission [https://perma.cc/7P5Z-8PYD]
(last visited Feb. 20, 2017).
10
453 U.S. 280 (1981).
11
Id. at 307.
12
See Evan Osnos, Doomsday Prep for the Super-Rich, NEW YORKER (Jan. 30, 2017),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/01/30/doomsday-prep-for-the-super-rich
[https://perma.cc/9WZA-Z2F3] (discussing how “[s]urvivalism, the practice of preparing for a crackup
of civilization . . . [has] in recent years . . . expanded to more affluent quarters, taking root in Silicon
Valley and New York City, among technology executives, hedge-fund managers, and others in their
economic cohort”).
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reasonable inference is established that a phone or similar device was used
by the perpetrator of a crime or terrorist act where the company involved
either designed it with “unbreakable” encryption or refuses to aid in its
decryption despite a court order?
Along these lines, in a nation where courts have traditionally resolved
the inherent tension between privacy and security, are we seeing
adjudication, de facto, shift to private entities with a commercial interest in
the outcome? Does former Director of the CIA John Brennan raise a
legitimate concern when he says, in reference to the Apple-FBI case, that:
So . . . if a judge issues a writ that says a safety deposit box
in a bank must be opened up because there’s something in
there either inculpatory, exculpatory of the crime or
something that’s going to allow us to prevent a crime, the
bank owner has a legal obligation to open it up. Same thing
with a warehouse owner, or somebody who owns an
apartment building. Now private sector companies are
getting the ability to say to the government and to the courts
and to our system of laws, no, I’m going to determine what
the government is going to be able to see or not[?]13
Moreover, in a free enterprise system, to what extent should the
legitimate financial interests of private companies14—not to mention the
bona fide individual interests and rights of the customers of that
company—prevail over the security interests of the public at large, to
include those whose financial means are such that they must depend upon
government for protection as the wealthy do not?15 How much privacy and
civil liberty does the public want to forfeit in a technological era that
Thomas Friedman tells us is enabling even individuals to become what he
calls “super-empowered” individuals to “kill all of us”?16 Is he correct
when he says, “[W]e need to ensure our government has all the
13

JOHN BRENNAN, A CANDID CONVERSATION WITH THE DIRECTOR OF THE CIA, INTERVIEW AT
ASPEN SECURITY FORUM 22 (Jul. 29, 2016), http://aspensecurityforum.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/07/a-candid-conversation-with-the-director-of-the-cia.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
XFD3-XQ9P] (emphasis added).
14
David Goldman, Apple’s iPhone Sales Sink for the First Time Ever Last Quarter, CNN (Apr.
26,
2016,
5:45
PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2016/04/26/technology/apple-earnings/
[https://perma.cc/7SN4-E68S].
15
See, e.g., Ian Mohr, Mark Zuckerberg Hired 16 Bodyguards to Protect Him at Home, PAGE SIX
(Feb. 14, 2016, 10:30 PM), http://pagesix.com/2016/02/14/mark-zuckerberg-has-16-bodyguards-at-hishome/ [https://perma.cc/T3P5-EV7F] (reporting that “young tech billionaires” like Mark Zuckerberg
can afford their own security details to protect them from “threats from unstable users”).
16
See Thomas L. Friedman, Opinion, Lessons of Hiroshima and Orlando, N.Y. TIMES (June 15,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/15/opinion/lessons-of-hiroshima-and-orlando.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/L6M9-NNNV] (“[W]e’re entering a world where small groups—maybe even soon a
single super-empowered person—will be able to kill all of us . . . .”).
THE
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surveillance powers it needs—under appropriate judicial review—to
monitor and arrest violent extremists of all stripes. The bad guys now have
too many tools to elude detection”?17
At the same time, however, we need to keep in mind, as Mieke Eoyang
has pointed out, that “[t]he debate is often framed as a balance between
government power and individual privacy.”18 Eoyang says this too often
overlooks the “critical role of the communications companies, who as
physical and legal gatekeepers regulate government access to private
information.”19 She also states that “when the government does not
properly balance the economic concerns with the national security
concerns it can harm U.S. competitiveness abroad.”20
The purpose of this short Essay is not to dissect the technicalities of the
Apple-FBI litigation, but rather to argue that in a democracy, there will
always be tensions between privacy and security. And in resolving such
tensions, social justice would call for a better accounting of the needs of
those who are not customers of a particular commercial entity and who
cannot depend for security upon their own resources, but rather must look
to law enforcement and government for protection.
I. CONTEXT
The Apple-FBI dispute resulted from a tragic December 2015 attack
by Syed Rizwan Farook and his wife, Tashfeen Malik, in San Bernardino,
California, in which fourteen people were killed and twenty-two were
injured in what has been called “a vicious and premeditated terrorist
attack.”21 Farook and Malik were later killed in a shootout with police.22
In the investigation that followed, a search pursuant to a warrant of
Farook’s vehicle produced a cell phone belonging to his employer, the San

17

Id. (emphasis added).
Mieke Eoyang & David Forscey, Beyond Privacy & Security: The Role of the
Telecommunications Industry in Electronic Surveillance, LAWFARE (Apr. 11, 2016, 7:22 AM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/beyond-privacy-security-role-telecommunications-industry-electronicsurveillance-0 [https://perma.cc/262R-9QZU].
19
Id.
20
Mieke Eoyang, Beyond Privacy and Security: The Role of the Telecommunications Industry in
Electronic Surveillance 5 (Hoover Inst., Aegis Paper Series No. 1603, Apr. 8, 2016),
http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/eoyang_privacysecurity_final_v3_digital.pdf
[https://perma.cc/63PW-4FBW].
21
RICK BRAZIEL ET AL., CRITICAL RESPONSE INITIATIVE, OFF. OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING
SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BRINGING CALM TO CHAOS: A CRITICAL INCIDENT REVIEW OF THE SAN
BERNARDINO PUBLIC SAFETY RESPONSE TO THE DECEMBER 2, 2015, TERRORIST SHOOTING INCIDENT
AT THE INLAND REGIONAL CENTER ix (2016), https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/file/891996/download
[https://perma.cc/3HFC-RM63].
22
See id. at 39–40 (explaining the gunfight and the manner in which the assailants were shot by
police).
18
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23

Bernardino County Department of Health. What happened next is
explained in the government’s later application to the court:
In the hopes of gaining crucial evidence about the December
2, 2015 massacre in San Bernardino, California, the
government has sought to search a lawfully-seized Apple
iPhone used by one of the mass murderers. Despite both a
warrant authorizing the search and the phone owner’s
consent, the government has been unable to complete the
search because it cannot access the iPhone’s encrypted
content. Apple has the exclusive technical means which
would assist the government in completing its search, but has
declined to provide that assistance voluntarily. Accordingly,
the government respectfully requests that this Court issue an
order compelling Apple to assist in enabling the search
commanded by the warrant.24
The government needed Apple’s technical assistance because the
phone’s software was such that the government was unable to “unlock” the
phone without risking the destruction of whatever data it might have
held.25 The court issued an order to Apple compelling their cooperation,26
but Apple resisted the court’s motion.27 Nevertheless, before there was any
definitive resolution, the government ended the litigation when it advised
the court it had “successfully accessed the data stored on Farook’s iPhone

23
Government’s Motion to Compel Apple Inc. to Comply with this Court’s Feb. 16, 2016 Order
Compelling Assistance in Search at 5, In re Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of
a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, California License Plate 35KGD203, No. ED 15-0451M,
2016 WL 618401769612 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2016).
24
Government’s Ex Parte Application for Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in
Search at 3, In re Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a
Black Lexus IS300, California License Plate 35KGD203, No. ED 15-0451M, 2016 WL 618401 (C.D.
Cal. Feb. 19, 2016).
25
Government’s Motion to Compel, supra note 23, at 5 (“Nonetheless, despite the search warrant
ordered by the Court and the owner’s consent to search the SUBJECT DEVICE, the FBI has been
unable to search [it] because it is ‘locked’ or secured with a user-determined, numeric passcode. More
to the point, the FBI has been unable to make attempts to determine the passcode to access the [device]
because Apple has written, or ‘coded,’ its operating systems with a user-enabled ‘auto-erase function’
that would, if enabled, result in the permanent destruction of the required encryption key material after
10 failed attempts at entering the correct passcode.”).
26
In re Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black
Lexus IS300, California License Plate 35KGD203, No. ED 15-0451M, 2016 WL 618401 (C.D. Cal.
Feb. 16, 2016) (order compelling Apple, Inc. to assist agents in search).
27
See Ellen Nakashima, Apple Vows to Resist FBI Demand to Crack iPhone Linked to San
Bernardino Attacks, WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/us-wants-apple-to-help-unlock-iphone-used-by-san-bernardino-shooter/2016/02/16/69b903eed4d9-11e5-9823-02b905009f99_story.html?postshare=9501485386886260&tid=ss_mail&utm_term=
.72ab40da8569 [https://perma.cc/A26U-HRSV] (explaining Apple’s decision to fight federal demands).
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and therefore no longer require[d] the assistance from Apple Inc.”28
II. THE APPLE STRATEGY
Apple always wanted to portray its case in a way that postured itself as
the defender of privacy and personal safety versus an Orwellian
government, but it is really more about a mammoth corporation’s interests
versus the rule of law and the people who do not happen to be their
customers or, if they are their customers, people without the resources of
those who would most benefit financially from the ability to sell a “law
enforcement proof” communications device.
Apple engaged in a well-conceived and well-executed public relations
campaign to propagate its view of the dispute. In a February 16, 2016 letter
to customers, Apple CEO Tim Cook characterized the FBI’s court order as
a threat to privacy which would “undermine the very freedoms and liberty
our government is meant to protect.”29 Similarly, the company’s Vice
President, Craig Federighi, wrote an op-ed claiming that “nothing is more
important than the safety” of Apple customers.30 Essentially, Apple argued
that “if it were to weaken the encryption on one phone, the encryption on
all phones of that type would be weakened, too.”31
According to Apple, the decryption “would in effect create an opening
through which some clever bad apple could wreak all kinds of chaos.”32 In
other words, Apple’s announced focus was on its customers. Quite
obviously, the FBI would be concerned not just with those who choose to
be Apple’s customers, but rather with the citizenry writ large, to include
those who elect not to be customers either by choice or by the absence of
financial resources. In addition, there are the interests of those for whom
the privacy value of an encrypted phone, whether theirs or another’s, does
not outweigh the desire to be protected from the mayhem of those whose
illicit activities would be facilitated by the technology.
The FBI did try to counter Apple’s hype and temper public concerns:
former FBI Director James Comey said law enforcement “simply want[s]
28
Government’s Status Report at 1, In re Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution
of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, California License Plate 35KGD203, No. ED 15-0451M
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2016); see also Proposed Order Vacating Feb. 16, 2016 Order, In re Search of an
Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, California
License Plate 35KGD203, No. ED 15-0451M (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2016) (“The Court has reviewed the
government’s Status Report . . . the Court hereby [vacates] the Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist
Agents in Search dated February 16, 2016.”).
29
Letter from Tim Cook, CEO, Apple, to Customers (Feb. 16, 2016),
http://www.apple.com/customer-letter/ [https://perma.cc/CER6-45KL].
30
Federighi, supra note 8.
31
Mark Sullivan, Where Will Trump Fall on the Encryption Debate? Tough Call, FAST CO. (Dec.
29, 2016, 3:00 PM), https://www.fastcompany.com/3066637/tech-forecast/where-will-trump-fall-onthe-encryption-debate-tough-call [https://perma.cc/CW5D-LPT5].
32
Id.
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the chance, with a search warrant, to try to guess the terrorist’s passcode
without the phone essentially self-destructing and without it taking a
decade to guess correctly. That’s it.”33
But Apple’s advocacy efforts enjoyed real success. Although initially
polls showed that the majority of Americans supported the FBI over Apple,
they later showed the public to be split more evenly.34 This led many, like
commentator Mark Sullivan, to conclude that “Apple eventually won the
PR war, successfully spreading the message that weakening encryption
hurts everybody and works against both national security and law
enforcement interests.”35
III. THE FINANCIAL FACTOR
Despite the way Apple presented its case, it is clear that it had interests
beyond the stated fear that “the very freedoms and liberty our government
is meant to protect” were in jeopardy.36 Specifically, it is apparent that
Apple was under real financial pressure at the time the San Bernardino
case arose. In April 2016, the corporation reported “its worst quarter in
over a decade.”37 More specifically as to the devices in the Apple-FBI case,
CNN said “iPhone sales fell for the first time in history.”38 This is critical
for Apple because “more than two-thirds of Apple’s revenue is made up of
iPhone sales.”39 Consequently, CNN’s David Goldman concludes that
“where the iPhone goes, so goes Apple.”40
Early on, the New York Times suggested that there were factors of
impersonal corporate interests at play in the case. The Times said:
The company is playing the long game with its business.
Privacy and security have become part of its brand,
especially internationally, where it reaps almost two-thirds of
its almost $234 billion a year in sales. And if it cooperates
with one government, the thinking goes, it will have to

33
James B. Comey, We Could Not Look the Survivors in the Eye If We Did Not Follow This Lead,
LAWFARE (Feb. 21, 2016, 9:03 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/we-could-not-look-survivors-eyeif-we-did-not-follow-lead [https://perma.cc/TSJ9-RKQW].
34
Ben Lovejoy, WSJ/NBC Poll Shows Public Support for Apple’s Side of FBI Battle Growing,
Now Close to Even Split, 9TO5MAC (Mar. 9, 2016 4:07 AM), https://9to5mac.com/2016/03/09/applefbi-public-poll-2/ [https://perma.cc/LR9W-K67M].
35
Sullivan, supra note 31.
36
Cook, supra note 29.
37
Goldman, supra note 14.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
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Businessman Blair Reeves made this point unequivocally:
For several years now, Apple has explicitly made “privacy” a
key marketing stick with which to beat its chief competitor,
Google. Certainly, a stated commitment to protect customer
privacy is vital to Apple’s brand and continuing business
strategy. Apple’s CEO and employees may be expressing
genuinely held private convictions, but the regulatory theater
in which Apple, the corporation, is currently embarked is
without question motivated by its business concerns.42
Of course, Silicon Valley, one of the greatest concentrations of
extreme wealth on the planet,43 rallied to support Apple, seeming to forget
that while they can hire armies of bodyguards and other security,44 the bulk
of the citizenry is vastly more vulnerable to those terrorists and criminals
who will exploit any inability of law enforcement and the courts to
penetrate their communications. The Silicon Valley billionaires seem to be
forgetting that the reason they have made all their money is that they are
privileged to live in a country with robust policing and a strong judiciary.
In addition, Apple makes two thirds of its sales overseas including
some $59 billion in China.45 The Los Angeles Times suggested that Apple
was trying to calm the national security concerns of the Chinese
government, while making accommodations, such as storing data on

41
Katie Benner & Paul Mozur, Apple Sees Value in Its Stand to Protect Security, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 20, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/21/technology/apple-sees-value-in-privacyvow.html?_r=2 [https://perma.cc/86W7-AN9Q].
42
Blair Reeves, Demystifying Apple’s FAQ—A Rebuttal, LAWFARE (Feb. 29, 2016, 12:24 PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/demystifying-apples-faq-–-rebuttal [https://perma.cc/AMJ9-2P5A].
43
See Rich Robinson, Silicon Valley: Richest Region in America Can, Must Do Better, SAN JOSE
INSIDE (Oct. 20, 2015), http://www.sanjoseinside.com/2015/10/20/silcion-valley-richest-region-inamerica-can-must-do-better/ [https://perma.cc/62T3-PH8M] (noting that the San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa
Clara metro area’s median household income is the highest in the United States); Josie Ensor, Silicon
Valley Mints 23 New Billionaires to Become Best Place to Get Rich, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 3, 2015, 12:28
AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/11446029/Silicon-Valley-mints23-new-billionaires-to-become-best-place-to-get-rich.html [https://perma.cc/J2QJ-RZVD] (noting that
Silicon Valley is “home to the greatest number of billionaires on the planet after China and the U.S.”).
44
See Mohr, supra note 15 ( “Insiders tell Page Six that the young tech billionaires are forced to
hire armies of guards after threats from unstable users.”).
45
See David Pierson, While It Defies U.S. Government, Apple Abides by China’s Orders—and
Reaps
Big
Rewards,
L.A.
TIMES
(Feb.
26,
2016,
3:00
AM),
http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-apple-china-20160226-story.html
[https://perma.cc/PMV2-QB9Z] (noting that sales of Apple products in the greater China region
reached $59 billion last year); Non-U.S. Share of Apple’s Revenue from 1st Quarter 2006 to 1st
Quarter 2017, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/263435/non-us-share-of-apples-revenue/
[https://perma.cc/FPU9-RF2M] (last visited Apr. 20, 2017) (showing that 64% of Apple’s revenue in
the first quarter of 2017 came from outside of the U.S.).

2017]

SOCIAL JUSTICE AND SILICON VALLEY

1695

46

vulnerable servers in China. The Times quoted James Lewis, senior
fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington,
who said:
“What’s driving this is Apple’s desire to persuade the global
market, and particularly the China market, that the FBI can’t
just stroll in and ask for data . . . . I can’t imagine the Chinese
would tolerate end-to-end encryption or a refusal to
cooperate with their police, particularly in a terrorism
case.”47
In short, Apple is—and has been—monetizing the value of privacy to
reinforce its brand in the marketplace. There is nothing unlawful, per se,
about a commercial interest in doing just that; this issue is to what extent—
if any—should that be limited.
IV. TRADE OFFS
A couple of things need to be made clear. In the first place, in a freeenterprise system, there is nothing illegal about a corporation seeking to
maximize its profits within the law. Indeed, there is much to be said about
the idea that competition in the marketplace injects an efficiency into
commerce that inures to the benefit of all. At the same time, however, the
untamed pursuit of profits has proven itself to be, at times, detrimental to
the society at large. For this reason, there are times when government
intervention is prudent and necessary.
One of those instances arises in resolving the inherent tension between
the value of a corporate quest for profits in a free-enterprise system, and
the interests of government in the security of the people. As to the latter,
the Supreme Court in Haig v. Agee observed that “[i]t is ‘obvious and
unarguable’ that no governmental interest is more compelling than the
security of the Nation.”48
Interestingly, Apple implicitly argued that even that imperative has its
limits. In its March 22, 2016 motion it said:
However, while the government’s desire to maximize
security is laudable, the decision of how to do so while also
protecting other vital interests, such as personal safety and
privacy, is for American citizens to make through the
democratic process. Indeed, examples abound of society
46
See Pierson, supra note 45 (describing how Apple shifted local user data onto China-based
servers after the Chinese state-run media raised national security concerns about the iPhone’s locationtracking feature).
47
Id.
48
453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981).
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opting not to pay the price for increased and more efficient
enforcement of criminal laws.49
Apple has a point. Though not one of the examples the Apple used, the
tragedy of the Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting does illustrate
“society opting not to pay the price” for greater security. In December
2015 an NBC News analysis found that in the three years since Adam
Lanza killed twenty children and six adults at the Sandy Hook Elementary
School, 555 children had been killed by intentional and unintentional gun
violence.50 As horrific as those numbers are, they pale in comparison with
the 1,907 children killed as occupants of motor vehicles during
approximately the same period.51 The Center for Disease Control (CDC)
estimates that in 2014 alone, 121,350 children age twelve and under
suffered a vehicle-related injury.52
What is particularly disturbing is how easily avoidable so many of
those deaths and injuries were. The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety
and the Highway Loss Data Institute insist that “proper restraint use can
reduce these fatalities.”53 They contend that studies show that the correct
use of car seats can reduce these fatalities. “Restraining children in rear
seats instead of front seats reduces fatal injury risk by about three quarters
for children up to age 3, and almost half for children ages 4 to 8.”54
For its part, the CDC says that in 2014, 34% of the children who were
killed were “not buckled up.”55 The CDC also says that a study found that
“more than 618,000 children ages 0 to 12 rode in vehicles without the use
of a child safety seat or booster seat or a seat belt at least some of the
time.”56 It “recommends car seat laws and car seat distribution plus
education programs to increase restraint use and decrease injuries and
deaths to child passengers.”57
These statistics indicate that draconian enforcement of car seat laws
49
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would likely save more children than restrictions on guns. But even if
Apple’s suggestion that Americans are willing to “pay the price for
increased and more efficient enforcement of criminal laws”58 is correct,
that is not necessarily the case here. Among other things, the Apple-FBI
confrontation involved terrorism, something markedly different in the
public’s mind. For example, a September 2016 Monmouth University poll
found that 56% of Americans believed that the government was not doing
enough to prevent a future attack.59
The terrorism concern is understandable. In his new book, Thank You
for Being Late, author Thomas Friedman makes the point that today’s
technology can create super-empowered terrorists, where even a single
individual can wreak havoc on unprecedented numbers of people.60 Even
more clearly than the Monmouth University poll, a Quinnipiac University
poll in September 2016 found that only 27% of Americans believed
government’s antiterrorism policies went “too far [in] restricting [the
average person’s] civil liberties,” while 51% said those policies “have not
gone far enough to adequately protect the country.”61 In short,
encryption—with its potential as a tool of terrorism—poses a unique threat
to public safety beyond that of ordinary criminality, which Apple seems to
be referencing.
V. THE SOCIAL JUSTICE QUESTIONS
Law enforcement needs to comply with the Constitution and other
legal requirements, and that typically requires getting a warrant or order
from a court. When that happens, law enforcement ought to get the access
the judge authorizes but no more. The Supreme Court in Riley v. California
recognized the increased privacy concerns surrounding modern
information technology—and specifically cell phones—and has extended
the range of Fourth Amendment protection accorded to devices, but the
Court has never suggested that the technologies ought to be beyond
judicial process if a company can make the technology hyper secure.62
That said, no company should think itself above the law. Apple
repeatedly cast the issue as one requiring resolution in the legislature. But
in the interim, Apple seems to want the power to decide sensitive questions
58
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of public security. Along these lines, former Director of the CIA John
Brennan commented on the Apple-FBI case by observing that tech
companies are now able to supplant the judgment of not just law
enforcement, but of the courts as well.63
Therefore, if a judge issues a writ that says a safety deposit box in a
bank must be opened up because there is something in there that is either
inculpatory, exculpatory, or something that is going to allow us to prevent
a crime, the bank owner has a legal obligation to open it up. The same
situation happens with a warehouse owner, or somebody who owns an
apartment building.
Now, private sector companies are getting the ability to say to the
government, and to the courts: “[N]o, I’m going to determine what the
government is going to be able to see or not.”64
Put another way, should a company be allowed to refuse to open some
kind of a safe, so as to allow a child pornographer to flaunt a bona fide
search warrant? Should a certain class of criminals be permitted to avoid
searches simply because they can afford to buy some kind of high-end safe
or data encryption device? Why should people who, for example, send
letters searchable with a warrant enjoy less privacy than someone who can
afford the latest high-tech data gadget?
This reiterates the fallacy of Craig Federighi, Apple’s Vice President,
that “nothing is more important than the safety” of Apple customers; that
logic does not comport with the fact that few things are more valuable to
the most dangerous terrorists and criminals than the ability to conceal their
communications from law enforcement and the courts.65 If Apple (or
anyone else) is allowed to sell devices that allow terrorists to plot and plan
in secret, those terrorists will surely be customers, as will a host of other
deviants and criminals.
Of course, the FBI and other law enforcement agencies still have to
comply with the law, even though they now have a way into the phone at
issue in the San Bernardino case. The ethical question is: given the horrific
terrorist incident involved, was it ethical for a company to delay law
enforcement’s access to this particular phone where the owner of the phone
wanted the FBI to have that access?
Some can literally afford to wait. After all, Silicon Valley is one of the
wealthiest places on earth. The tech moguls who live there have little to
worry about in terms of security for themselves and their families, as they
can afford to buy as many layers of protection as they want. The rest of the
citizenry, however, depend upon law enforcement agencies for protection,
and their success in that effort can depend upon the ability to get
63
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information in compliance with court orders. Fortunately, another attack
did not take place this time, but we all can imagine a different outcome in
some future case. Should security really depend upon our ability to buy it
privately as tech tycoons can?
Make no mistake about it, the residents of Silicon Valley and similarly
privileged enclaves are concerned about their own security and are using
their economic superiority to ensure it in ways that most Americans
cannot. A recent New Yorker article addressing the “Doomsday Prep for
the Super-Rich,” pointed out that “[s]ome of the wealthiest people in
America—in Silicon Valley, New York, and beyond—are getting ready for
the crackup of civilization.”66 The article noted that:
Survivalism, the practice of preparing for a crackup of
civilization, tends to evoke a certain picture: the woodsman
in the tinfoil hat, the hysteric with the hoard of beans, the
religious doomsayer. But in recent years survivalism has
expanded to more affluent quarters, taking root in Silicon
Valley and New York City, among technology executives,
hedge-fund managers, and others in their economic cohort.67
If one of Apple’s motives for resisting the court order centered on its
financial interests and brand value, perhaps Congress should devise a
market-driven solution and create an appropriate cause of action for
victims of terrorist incidents or other crimes. For example, if the evidence
shows that the perpetrator had an encrypted device, a rebuttable
presumption that such a device facilitated a plaintiff’s victimization might
be created by statute. The company could then choose to either provide
access to the device to demonstrate that it had no connection with the
incident, or accept the liability and inject that cost into the price of the
device. Experience with big business—auto manufacturers, drug makers,
chemical giants, tobacco companies, and more—shows that too often it
needs to be motivated by the fear of lawsuits in order to take actions to
protect public safety.
By obliging the FBI to turn to a private contractor to crack the
encryption, Apple may have incentivized legitimate companies to get into
the business of cracking phones and other high-tech devices for law
enforcement. In essence, they have broadened the legal market for hackers
and others.
Moreover—and rather ironically—Apple’s intransigence may have
backfired. As journalist Chris Smith observed, the success of the FBI’s
contractor “proves what we all suspected: that independent security
companies and hackers know how to bypass the safety of the iPhone and
66
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other devices if need be.” In essence, Apple created a legitimate market
for hacking its phones on behalf of law enforcement. Moreover, instead of
controlling the ability to unlock the phones, as would have been the case
had Apple complied with the initial demand, that capability is now in the
hands of the FBI—and it appears that the FBI is willing to share its success
with other law enforcement agencies.69
Indeed, did Apple’s recalcitrance endanger its own customers? Recall
that Apple itself said that once an encryption-cracking protocol was
developed, the technique could be used over and over again, on any
number of devices. Apple said that “in the physical world, it would be the
equivalent of a master key, capable of opening hundreds of millions of
locks—from restaurants and banks to stores and homes.”70 It seems that
tech companies are better off complying with court orders, and using or
developing their own means of accessing their own products, than they are
at acting in a way that invites other entities, over whom they have no
control, to set up shop to serve law enforcement in these kinds of
situations.
CONCLUSION
This brief Essay can at best be said to touch upon just a few of the
issues raised by the “going dark” debate. That debate is hardly over. In
August 2016, FBI Director James Comey described the situation of some
5,000 cell phones forwarded to the FBI for forensic examination. Comey
said of the cell phones:
About 650 of them we could not open. We did not have the
technology. We can’t open them. They are a brick to us.
Those are cases unmade. That’s evidence unfound. That has
a significant impact on our work and on the work of law
enforcement. We see this shadow, this inability to execute on
court orders, becoming more and more a part of our life as
encryption—especially strong encryption for data at rest,
default encryption on devices—becomes a bigger feature of
our life.71
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Of course, in a real way, the “going dark” debate raises profound
issues about the role of technology in our society. In a fascinating (albeit
hyper partisan) essay considering the recent election, Wired Editor-atLarge Jason Tanz makes some interesting observations about the impact of
communication technologies on contemporary political life, as well as
somewhat indirect comments on the prescience and wisdom (or, more
accurately, the absence of the same) of some tech entrepreneurs.72
Ruefully noting that President Trump used the “tools and language of
the technocracy” to gain the White House, Tanz concludes that Silicon
Valley efforts at designing technology to “maximize engagement . . .
inadvertently created hives of bias-confirmation and tribalism.”73
If one overlooks Tanz’s politics, he does pose some trenchant broader
questions that resonate in social justice. As he says, society needs to ask
itself “bigger questions”:
Questions like: Is technology always an ennobling force?
Questions like: Does allowing humanity untrammeled access
to one another always result in a better world? Questions
like:
Are individuals capable of processing all the
information that they once relied on institutions to process
for them? Questions like: After people free themselves from
their social and cultural shackles, then what?74
The full essay does suggest that Tanz has a sense of his own elitism,
but the power of his questions remains. In a free society, to what extent
should the byte barons of Silicon Valley determine what law enforcement
professionals can and cannot do, particularly when they can insulate
themselves from the consequences of their decisions?
Congress may act. In an election year when partisanship seems to
know no limits, leaders from the two parties did work together to try to
reign in the tech moguls. Senators Dianne Feinstein (D-Cal.) and Richard
Burr (R-N.C.) authored a draft bill entitled the “Compliance with Court
Orders Act of 2016.”75 Its key section simply said:
To uphold both the rule of law and protect the interests and
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security of the United States, all persons receiving an
authorized judicial order for information or data must
provide, in a timely manner, responsive, intelligible
information or data, or appropriate technical assistance to
obtain such information or data . . . .76
The proposal immediately drew howls of protest from the tech
industry, apoplectic over what they claimed—with some real logic—
“basically outlaws end-to-end encryption.”77 The bill died.
Despite the poor reception for the Feinstein-Burr effort, Austin Carson,
a legislative director for House Homeland Security Chairman Michael
McCaul, said that McCaul will likely “re-introduce legislation to create a
commission charged with examining tradeoffs between privacy and
security in digital technology” in 2017.78 Carson said that is far better than
having events such as cases “where someone’s child’s been abducted . . .
[or one] with national security implications” drive policy.79 He is probably
right when he predicted that if such events occur “it’s going to be a
horribly irrational conversation.”80
Commissions and studies are all well and good, but there is little to
suggest that there is a better way of finding that balance in much the same
way it’s always been—that is, for the courts to determine what is or is not
permitted by the Constitution and the applicable statutes. There is nothing
to dispute the idea that most people are satisfied with having the courts
make these tough calls.
Of course, as a society, we can decide that we want more privacy than
the Constitution or existing law might provide, but we ought not kid
ourselves that there is no cost to doing so. It is certain that every terrorist,
drug dealer, Wall Street cheat, sex-slaver, and crook of every variety will
use a secure device if they think it will shield them from law enforcement,
and to the extent that using such devices fulfills that desire, we have to
expect and accept more terrorism and more crime. Significantly, that cost
and risk will not be borne by those who are profiting from the devices, but
by those without the resources or ability to protect themselves.
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